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We are fundamentally persons, so lynne Baker says; i argue that, assuming her 
metaphysical framework, this cannot be the case.
We ARe not, FUnDAMentALLy, 
PeRsons
151
in this paper i want to argue that, assuming lynne baker’s metaphysical 
framework, one has to conclude that, contrary to what she says, beings like 
us are not fundamentally persons.
let us begin by considering some features baker attributes to beings like us, 
and let us focus on me, for the sake of simplicity.
as is well known, baker is a prominent supporter of what can be called the 
‘metaphysics of constitution’1, and, she says, i am constituted by, but not 
identical with, my body2. and notice: i am essentially constituted by a body, 
even though not necessarily a human one; i could, in fact, be constituted by 
an artificial or a bionic or even a spiritual body, but I could not survive the 
sudden disappearance of all bodies3.
so i am constituted by a body and this, according to baker, is an essential 
feature of mine. What other properties do i possess? Well, i have many 
other properties, but the one which characterizes me fundamentally is the 
property of being a person: person, as baker says, is my ‘primary kind’4. let 
us briefly see what, exactly, a primary kind is.
For any entity x we can ask “What fundamentally is x?” and the answer 
will be what baker calls “x’s primary kind”: everything that exists is of 
exactly one primary kind – e.g. a horse, a tomato, a passport, an apple, a 
statue, a dog, and so on and so forth5. moreover, an object’s primary kind 
determines what sort of changes it can undergo and still exist, and what 
sorts of changes would result in its ceasing to exist altogether; put briefly, 
an object’s primary kind determines its persistence conditions, so that if K is 
a primary kind, and x and y are Ks, then x and y have the same persistence 
conditions, namely the ones K determines6.
What i have said so far will be, of course, very familiar to every reader of 
baker’s books and papers: i have simply given a brief summary of some of 
the theses baker most frequently insists on. so one may be surprised to 
discover that these theses seem to lead quickly to a thorny problem. 
1   baker (2000, 2007a). see, also, for example, Wasserman (2004) and olson (2007, pp. 48-59).
2   baker (2000, pp. 91-101; 2007a, pp. 67-94).
3   baker (2000, p. 214; 2007b).
4   see, for example, baker (2000, p. 96; 2007a, p. 38).
5   For example: baker (2000, pp. 39-40; 2007a, pp. 67-68).
6   see, for example, baker (2000, pp. 39-40; 2007a, p. 33, pp. 219-220; 2013, p. 224).
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let us see what the problem is by considering the following argument, 
whose first and second premises simply restate two of Baker’s main tenets 
which i have just talked about:
Premise 1) Person is a primary kind.
Premise 2) if Person is a primary kind, and x and y are persons, then x and y 
have the same persistence conditions.
now add to these two premises the following thesis:
Premise 3) god (if he exists), angels (if they exist), immaterial or cartesian 
souls (if they exist), and beings like us are all persons.
From the three premises just stated, one can immediately conclude that 
god, angels, cartesian souls and beings like us all share the same persistence 
conditions. but this, of course, is simply absurd (for example: we cannot survive 
the disappearance of all bodies – we are essentially constituted by a body – 
while god, angels and cartesian souls can). so here we have a real predicament: 
what premises would baker reject?
consider the possibility of rejecting premise 3). Perhaps a non-christian 
philosopher would be inclined to say that it is a mistake to think of god as a 
person – and so she would deny the thesis according to which if god exists, then 
god is a person. yet, notice that this idea is a non-starter for baker, who is a 
committed christian.
but let us set aside divine – and angelical – topics, and let us focus just on 
cartesian souls. these entities have a sophisticated mental life – they reason, 
desire, hope, feel, and so on: denying that these things have the status of persons 
is indeed very implausible, and so it seems difficult to deny premise 3) entirely.
but supposing premise 3) was concerned just with souls, a friend of baker could 
perhaps say that they are not persons exploiting the following idea: according 
to baker, if x is a person, then x has a language, and if something has a language, 
then it belongs to a linguistic community7. but, one could say, souls cannot 
belong to a linguistic community, so souls are not persons – and the ‘just souls’ 
version of premise 3) would be refuted.
and yet: is it really true that souls cannot belong to a linguistic community? i do 
not think so. suppose that something like descartes metaphysics is on the right 
7   see, for example, baker (2013).
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track, and so suppose that there are immaterial souls causally interacting with 
bodies and, through these bodies, with each other: given this mutual interaction 
it is quite obvious, it seems to me, that these souls can belong to a linguistic 
community, and so they may well be persons.
thus the prospects for denying premise 3), even in its ‘just souls’ version, are, i 
think, rather dim. let us focus, then, on the second premise, and let us consider 
three different ways of denying it.
1st way – a denier of premise 2) could say: “it is true that person is a primary kind, 
and it is true that, god, angels, souls and beings like us are all persons; but it is 
not true that god, angels and souls share with us their persistence conditions. 
this is because god, angels and souls simply cannot have persistence conditions. 
Why so? Well, God is the absolute, infinite being, an entity to which one cannot 
correctly attribute any persistence condition; as for angels and souls, they are 
immaterial beings and it is not clear what would make them cease to exist”.
to this i offer two answers.
a) the persistence conditions associated with an entity x can be thought of 
as determining two disjoint sets: the set of what x can survive and the set of 
what x cannot survive. in the case of god the second set is plausibly empty, 
but this is not to say that god does not have persistence conditions: rather, 
he possesses trivial persistence conditions, which is quite another thing. as 
for angels and souls, god certainly could annihilate them: so they do seem 
to have persistence conditions, and not even trivial ones.
b) but let us concede, for the sake of argument, that god, angels and souls 
do not have persistence conditions. in this case, and by baker’s own lights, 
one has to confront a troublesome consequence. let us see what this 
consequence is, by first considering the following principle held by Baker: 
for every possible world w and every time t,
(Pc) if x exists in w at a time t and x is not eternal in w, then x has 
persistence conditions in w8.
now, let us focus on souls, and consider any possible world w in which souls exist. We 
are assuming that souls cannot have persistence conditions, and so souls do not have 
persistence conditions in w. so, by Pc and modus tollens, one has to conclude that 
it is not the case that (souls exist in w at a time t and souls are not eternal in w).
8   baker (2007a, p. 221). reference to possible worlds is mine but it can be considered implicit in 
baker’s original statement.
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so, either souls do not exist in time in w – that is, in w they exist outside of 
time – or they are eternal in w9. and, given that “eternal” can mean “outside 
of time” or “existing at each moment in time”, the upshot is that, in w, either 
souls exist outside of time or they exist at each moment in time.
Let us state briefly where we have got to: if one assumes that souls cannot 
have persistence conditions, then
For every possible world w in which souls exist, either souls are outside of 
time in w, or they exist at each moment in time in w.
but, of course, cartesian souls do not exist outside of time, and so, for every 
possible world w in which souls exist, they exist at each moment in time in w. 
and this is the troublesome consequence of assuming that souls cannot have 
persistence conditions: saying that for every possible world w in which souls 
exist, they exist at each moment in time in w, means that it is metaphysically 
impossible for a universe inhabited, at a certain time, by souls to exist without 
souls – a quite implausible thesis by itself, and certainly not a thesis that most 
committed christians like baker would be happy to endorse.
2nd way – a denier of premise 2) could, nonetheless, try another line of 
argument: “the persistence conditions of beings like us are not determined 
solely by our being persons, but also by the bodies that constitute us. so it 
is true that person is a primary kind, and it is true that, god, angels, souls, 
and beings like us are all persons; but it is not true that god, angels and 
souls share with us their persistence conditions, because our persistence 
conditions are partly determined by the bodies that constitute us, and 
these bodies do not constitute god, angels and souls”. in conversation baker 
herself has suggested a reply along these lines to me but i have to say that i 
find it quite puzzling, and I am going to briefly explain why.
certainly god is not constituted by anything – and baker says so following 
what most christian traditions have upheld10; moreover postulating a sort 
of ‘spiritual stuff ’ constituting angels or souls is really quite implausible. so 
one should say that god, angels and souls are not constituted by anything, 
and therefore that their persistence conditions are fully determined by the 
9   let me unravel this line of reasoning a little. it is not the case that (souls exist in w at a time 
t and souls are not eternal in w) implies that either (1) it is not the case that souls exist in w at a 
time t or (2) it is not the case that souls are not eternal in w. let us consider (1). souls do exist in 
w, we have assumed, so if (1) is true, then it has to be the case that souls exist in w and they do 
not exist at a time t. but, of course, time t is a variable standing for any time whatsoever, and so 
one has to say that souls exist in w and that they do not exist at any time; therefore souls exist in 
w outside of time. Finally, and obviously, (2) implies that souls are indeed eternal in w.
10   baker (2007a, p. 79).
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primary kind to which they belong, namely the primary kind person. but 
then – first problem – it seems rather peculiar to say that this is not the case 
for beings like us.
More importantly – second problem – it is quite difficult to reconcile the 
idea according to which we are fundamentally persons with the idea that 
what we fundamentally are does not fully determine our persistence 
conditions.
and to these one may add a third problem. baker says that the body that 
is now constituting me, let us say b, belongs to the primary kind “human 
body”, and so, of course, b cannot survive the disappearance of all biological 
bodies11. but if b contributes to determining my persistence conditions, 
it seems that i cannot survive the disappearance of all biological bodies, 
either, and this runs against what baker says about beings like us, namely 
that we can have bionic or artificial bodies, and so that we can survive the 
disappearance of all biological bodies.
3rd way – Let us finally consider a third way to deny premise 2) which is 
somewhat related to the one just examined12: “We are fundamentally 
persons, and person is a determinable kind-property which can be 
determined in different ways – human person being one such possible 
determination. if so, then, arguably, from ‘x and y are persons’, it does not 
follow that ‘x and y have the same persistence conditions’ – contra premise 
2)”. is this a convincing line of reasoning? clearly, it does not seem to be. if 
we are fundamentally persons, then person is our primary kind – a primary 
kind, Baker says, is by definition the kind-property which determines what 
a thing fundamentally is. so according to the proponent of the 3rd way, 
person is at the same time a primary kind and a determinable kind-property. 
but how could a determinable kind-property determine what a thing 
fundamentally is? determinable kind-properties, such as mammal, artifact, 
elementary particle, or vegetable, clearly do not define the fundamental nature 
of their bearers, as instead kind-properties such as horse, statue, electron or 
cabbage do. so one cannot say, on pain of contradiction, that person is both a 
primary kind and a determinable kind-property.
to conclude: i have considered some arguments through which baker could 
deny premise 2) or premise 3), and could block the conclusion that god, angels, 
cartesian souls and beings like us all share the same persistence conditions; 
11   suppose it can: then b, which is fundamentally a human organism, can exist in a world 
deprived of all biological bodies, which is absurd.
12   i owe this objection to an anonymous referee.
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but these arguments, i have tried to show, fail. now, perhaps baker has the 
resources and the ability to plausibly deny, in different ways, premise 2) or 3), 
but i cannot see how this could be done. so, i believe, the only choice left is to 
deny premise 1), but this means that person is not a primary kind, and a fortiori 
that it is not our primary kind. so, assuming baker’s metaphysical framework, 
we are not fundamentally persons, which is what i wanted to argue for.
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